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Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria's Development: Comparative
Perspectives from Canadian Fiscal Federalism
Ekanade 01umide
This paper evaluates the historical dynamics that have shaped the development
of fiscal federalism in igeria and Canada over the years. It contends that
certain contradictions have inhibited the efficient and equitable allocation of
tax powers and expenditure responsibilities in igeria. These include Nigeria's
defective federal structure, military rule, Presidential federalism, politicized
sharing principles, and the parochial political culture. These absurdities now
threaten the stability of the igerian federation. The paper submits that the
Canadian Federation offers a viable option for renewal with principles such as
autonomy of sub national units, the predominance of the civic culture,
scientific equalization, and dependence of intergovernmental relations on
mutual convenience rather than on statutes.

Introduction
"There is and can be no final solution to the allocation of financial resources in
a federal system. There can only be adjustments and re-allocations in the light
of changing conditions: what a federal government needs therefore is
machinery adequate to make these adjustments" Kenneth C. Wheare (Oates,
1972, p.65).

Though this seems to be an apt description of the practice of fiscal
federalism in both developed and developing nations, its actual practice differs
from country to country depending on its historical evolution. Federalism is
therefore not a static concept. Like any other political institution, it is subject to
evolution.
This paper comparatively examines the evolution and practice of fiscal
federalism in Nigeria and Canada while it also identifies lessons for the Nigerian
state. Nigerian and Canadian federations are both large and multi-cultural
societies engaged in the great effort to construct national unity on the basis of
their federal constitutions. For Canada, having survived till date the turbulent
periods in its evolution as a federation, its practice of federalism seems to have
stood the test of time. Fiscal problems that arose within the Canadian federation
have proVided a framework within which important prinCiples have been
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developed and tested. These principles can therefore contribute a great deal to the
understanding of related issues and solving problems in other federal systems. An
emergent federation like Nigeria can learn valuable lessons from the older
Canadian federation. The unraveling of these enduring principles is the corpus of
this study.

The History
Nigeria is a federal country with a constitutional division of powers and
functions among the central, state, and local governments. Federalism was
formally adopted in Nigeria in 1954 (Adebayo, 1993, p. 19) under the Lyttelton
constitution when the country was restructured into three quasi self-governing
and administered regions. Before 1954, the Nigerian state was administered by
the British colonial power largely as a unitary state. The colonial power adopted
federalism for Nigeria as a structural response to the centrifugal tendencies
inherent in Nigeria's pluralistic society and secondly as a mechanism needed to
manage the diverse functions which a modern government is expected to
perform. Some of these functions could be more efficiently handled at lower
levels such as states and local governments. Consequently the successive federal
regimes have had to set up fiscal commissions at various intervals to handle
multi-level government financing and deal with the counterpart issues of intergovernmental fiscal relations so that each tier of government in the Nigerian
federation would have adequate resources to discharge assigned functions. Till
date, Nigeria has had four ad-hoc colonial fiscal commissions, three postcolonial ad-hoc commissions, and one permanent fiscal commission known as
Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) (Olomola,
1999, pp. 488-490).

Structural Crisis) Trials and Travails of Nigeria)s Fiscal Federalism:
Historical Overview
The problem of revenue distribution has been a structural challenge with
Nigeria from inception. In the colonial era even though equity was not at the
epicenter of Nigeria's fiscal federalism, the principles for the apportionment of
national revenues evolved by the colonial commissions emphasized national
integration, fiscal efficiency, and cohesion. These principles ironically bred
interregional disunity as much as it accelerated uneven development. Much more
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importantly, the colonial tactics of divide and rule made revenue allocation
challenge a winner take all affair, i.e., new formula always favored the critic.
Cumulatively, this stress and strain exerted on the polity by the regional
elites at the period weakened the igerian state (as evidenced in the post-colonial
era) and made the revenue sharing issue an unsettled affair in financial
administration in igeria.
Nigeria became a self governing entity on October 1, 1960. The
independence and republican constitutions dictated the tone and tenor of
financial relations; however, inequity pervaded all facets of financial
administration in igeria both vertically and horizontally. The authoritative
allocation of funds among the regions was hampered by the intervention of
regionalism. This engendered unhealthy ethnic competition for scarce federal
economic resources. Given the appropriation of federal power by the Northern
Peoples Congress (NPC) between 1960 and 1966, the party used political power
in its possession to mobilize and divert federal revenues, infrastructure, and
federal patronage to her ethnic homeland. This scenario engendered hostility
against the ruling party and its hegemonist tendency. This remotely was one of
the underlying causes of the crisis that engulfed the Nigerian state and led to
political instability and eventually the demise of the first republic in 1966
(Ekanade, 2008, p. 143).

The Two Military Interregna and the Management of Nigerian Federal
Finance 1966-1978 and 1983-1999
With the inception of military rule in Nigeria in 1966 there was a paradigm
shift in financial administration in Nigeria. Nigeria's federal finance moved from
fiscal federalism to fiscal centralism. Here the successive military regimes used
decrees to centralize the collection and control of buoyant and robust sources of
the national revenues. The military also created extra statutory accounts and
employed highly politicized prinCiples of population and inter-state equity to
redistribute funds at the expense of more rational principles of derivation and
internal revenue generation effort. The implications of these are that the actions
feathered the nests of the military ruling class and in addition disproportionately
shifted revenues from the oil rich minority southern states to the less productive
northern states of Nigeria, most of which COincidentally produced these military
rulers. This process has legitimized the warped and iniquitous nature of Nigerian
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federal finance. Consequently, agitations for reform and even secession have been
endemic in the resource rich states and these now threaten the integrity and very
survival of the Nigerian federation. To this extent, the necessity for reforms is
emphasized and the Canadian model offers a viable and credible option for
Nigeria.

Evolution of the Canadian Federation
Canada is the second largest country by area in the world (Calvocorressi,
2001, p. 767). It is a federal country that practices parliamentary democracy. It
has the Governor General (representing the Queen of England) at the federal
level and a Lieutenant General at the provincial level.
Canada is the product of the 1867 union of four colonies in British North
America - Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario. It was born out of
a necessity for survival. Six other provinces subsequently joined Canada,
Manitoba in 1870, British Colombia in 1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873,
Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905, and Newfoundland in 1949 (Mclean, 2003, p.
3) In addition there were three Northern territories; Yukon, the Northwest
territories and Nunavut, carved out of the Northwest territories in 1999 (Dare,
2003, p.103). The Canadian Union thus evolved through a process of aggregation
and further developed and expanded through the process of further
incorporation of new provinces. The aforementioned ten provinces are the basic
units of the Canadian federation (Leach, 1984, p.10). The two largest provinces
are Ontario and Quebec containing more than half of Canada's population
between them (McLean, 2003, p. 10).
The Canadian federation is often referred to as a pact among the provinces
with emphasis on the fact that the "British North American Act" (BNA)
embodied a compromise under which the original provinces agreed to federate.
In other words, the authority and powers of the provincial government do not
flow from the central government. On the contrary it is the central government
which owes its very existence and survival to the willing consent of the provinces
as the provinces predated the federal government (Dare, 2003, p. 98).
Canada's experience differs considerably from that of igeria. In igeria it
is the states that owe their existence and survival to the consent of the central
government. This is because the states were created by the central government,
and thus creating the states' inability to assert their autonomy. To this extent one
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can affirm that Canadian federalism is aggregative while Nigeria's federalism is
disaggregative.

Constitutional Status of the Federal-Provincial (State) Governments
The Canadian federal government and the 10 provincial governments are
recognized and independent of each other. There is really no hierarchical
relationship between the two orders of government (Boadway &Watts, 2004, p.
3).
The BNA of 1867 is silent on intergovernmental fiscal matters, except that
sections 114-117 set out liabilities of Canada and the provinces for their public
debts at confederation. Section 118 provided for grants-in-aid from Canada to
the provincial governments of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New
Brunswick (the original federation). Section 92 of the 1867 Act gave the provinces
power over the management and sale of the public lands in the provinces and of
the timber and wood thereon. The 1867 BNA in 1982 was renamed Constitution
Act, 1867. Thus in 1982, section 92Awas added to the 1867 Act and it broadened
provincial authority over natural resources (McLean, 2003, p. 2).
Thus under the Canadian constitution, the provincial governments own and
control land and natural resources including minerals and are entitled to royalties
from their exploitation (Esman, 1984, p. 33). This contrasts with the Nigerian
arrangement where constitutionally, the ownership and control of land and
natural resources has shifted over time from the states to the federal government.
This shift was due mainly to the intervention of the military in the nation's
political process. More so, the unitary nature of the military necessitated the
centralization of the nation's resources (Asobie, 2001, p. 151). This approach has
denied states the much needed autonomy in financial matters which has in turn
inhibited the development of healthy intergovernmental fiscal relations.
Furthermore, resolution 35(3) of the 1982 Canadian constitution stated that
parliament and the government of Canada were committed to the principle of
making equalization payments to the provinces. This was to ensure that
provinces would have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels
of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation (Smiley, 1984, p. 43)
for all Canadian citizens. This system was designed so because Canada is
geographically large with widely differing natural resource endowments and a
socially diverse population (Litvack, 1994, p. 231). The Nigerian state too at a
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period adopted the equalization principle because of the variations in resource
endowments among the constituent units. However, the equalization method in
Nigeria is not as developed as that of Canada. The equalization principle in
Nigeria does not take into account states' needs and absorptive capacity.
Moreover, the derivation component in Nigeria's revenue sharing formula has
overshadowed whatever equity impact the equalization formula (equality of
states) was supposed to have (Ayoade, personal communication, 2006). To this
extent, the Nigerian central government was not able to provide reasonably
comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation
for all Nigerian citizens. In this regard also, the fact that the Nigerian state does
not have a highly developed tax culture has hindered the central government
from performing its functions effectively.
It is interesting to note that one fundamental change initiated with the
repatriation of the Canadian constitution in 1982 (Constitution Act 1867)
reflected strongly in intergovernmental financial relations. Here, the provinces
were given limited powers of taxation. Section 92 of the Act confined provinces
to only "direct taxation" in order to raise revenue for provincial purposes. Unlike
the provinces, the federal government got very wide and exclusive taxing powers.
Section 91 of the same Act states that the federal government may raise revenue
by any mode or system of taxation; this may include direct and indirect taxation.
The section also gave to the federal government all residual legislative and
regulatory powers that are not assigned to the provinces. This has allowed the
federal government to significantly expand its de-facto policy jurisdiction
(Boadway & Watts, 2004, p. 14). In addition, the courts have supported a broad
interpretation of the federal government's revenue raising and expenditure
powers and have consequently upheld the federal government's right to spend its
own source revenue in areas of both concurrent and exclusive provincial
jurisdiction (Boadway &Watts, 2004, p. 6). To this extent, the structural
differences between Nigeria and Canada (in terms of financial power relations
involving the two tiers of government) are quite modest. In Nigeria, though the
federal government is much more influential than the federating units in the
allocation of tax powers, expenditure responsibilities, and jurisdictional powers
between them.
In Canada, intergovernmental fiscal arrangements have depended more on
convention and mutual convenience than on statute. This is because the fusion of
responsibilities of the parliament (Ronald, 1987, p. 782), federal legislature and
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provincial governments did not commit any harm to anything justifiable
(McLean, 2003, p. 3). Thus the federal provincial conference has been the main
arena for bargaining for the control of public revenues between the federal
government and provinces (Esman, 1984, p. 33). The conference is a nonconstitutional forum and agreements struck there are incorporated into highly
technical bills which are ratified with little scrutiny by both provincial and federal
parliaments (Esman, 1984, p. 27).
This is possible in Canada because intergovernmental fiscal relations are not
hierarchical, and it is the provinces that own and control resources. Replicating
this in Nigeria would be difficult because of the hierarchical nature of federalstate relations. Constitutionally, i~ is the central government that controls the
buoyant sources of the nation's revenues (Constitution of Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999, Sec. 66).
It is pertinent to note that under the Canadian constitution, the federal
government of Canada also has authority to tax natural resources through the
corporate income tax on oil and gas. Here, there is the provincial ownership of
resources and federal regulation on the same resources. Ideally this is what the
Nigerian federal government ought to do in the administration of the federation.
The federal government should hand off the ownership of resources and use
federal power to tax those resources. This could be an effective panacea for the
unending crisis in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

The Problem of Allocation of Revenue and Expenditure
Responsibilities
The basic problem that Canada encountered like other federations as early
as the 1930s was the challenge of an imbalance between financial resources and
functional responsibilities. Here the central government dominated the most
productive and elastic tax sources while major functions of government were left
to the provinces. To cope with this unevenness, Canada resorted to fiscal
transfers (Esman, 1984, p. 31). The progression was such that the federal
government gave conditional grants (which required counterpart provincial
funding) to the provinces so as to ensure the attainment of overall national
objectives. From 1967, the federal government introduced unconditional grants
alongside equalization grants to the provinces (Smiley, 1972, pp. 44-45). The
unconditional grants were to help provide financial assistance on a scale
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sufficient to bring the yield of all provincial revenues from own sources up to the
national average yield (Mathews, 1974, p. 27). The equalization grant was to help
provinces raise revenue to provide public services at the same standard as those
adopted by other provincial governments operating at the level of the recipient
governments (Mathews, 1974, p. 3).
Equalization is the promotion of more equality in opportunities, status,
income, wealth, and general well being among people, states, and provinces
(Todaro, 1998, p. 690). Canada's federal finance as shown above has been very
dynamic and responsive to countrywide welfare services.
In the Nigerian context, equality of states is roughly the equivalent of the
equalization concept of Canada. ~here is, however, a major difference. The
equality principle in Nigeria was and is still unresponsive and static with a
permanent percentage weight allotted to it. It has not solved the problem of
imbalance between revenue generation and expenditure responsibilities. This
needs to be modified since equity itself should be perceived in elastic terms. The
Nigerian government would need to develop a proper yardstick for resource
equalization in order to assist resource--poor units. Using the three geo-zones
standard as obtained in Australia (not too rich and not too poor state) could be
used to arrive at a standard national average (McLean, 2003, p. 7) for revenue
sharing. It then means that any zone whose revenues do not amount to the
standard national average would be entitled to revenue equalization grants from
the federal government. In this regard the central government would have used
its power of macro-economic regulation and taxation to scoop excess revenue
from the very rich zones through the instrumentality of taxation and redistribute
the incomes to the resource poor zones. By this way the latter would be able to
provide a comparable level of public services for their citizens similar to what is
obtainable in other zones. This process of equalization acts as a moderating
influence on the disparities that would have existed among federating units in
terms of revenue generation and expenditure. Again, the sense of equity that the
concept fosters in the federation can help to eliminate the threat of secession by
any zone. As it stands, state equalization in Nigeria is determined more by the
central government using its own criteria.
The Canadian formula for equalization interestingly took no account of
differences in tax effort; the equalization grant only reflected differences in
revenue raising capacity of provinces (Mathews, 1974a, p. 31). This is because it is
possible for provinces to engage in sharp practices by not declaring their actual
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revenue. They may do this so that they would not pay taxes commensurate to
their profit to the federal government. Thus the federal government through the
Federal Department of Finance examines provinces' revenue raising capacity and
not their effort (declared revenue) to determine recipients of equalization grants
(McLean, 2003, p. 7).

Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations in the ational Energy Policy
Challenge: A Study in Political Compromise
In 1982 the Canadian government made its desire known that it would cut
its payment to the provinces substantially. The government also indicated it
would seek changes in the equalization formula and shift part of the costs of the
program to the resource-rich provinces substantially. The government also
indicated it would seek changes in the equalization and shift part of the costs of
the program to the resource-rich province (Leach, 1984, p. 13). Several provinces
opposed it but the federal government after failing in its negotiations with the
provinces introduced the bill to the parliament, got the latter's approval, and
proceeded unilaterally with the legislation (Leach, 1984, p. 13). The whole idea
was to centralize economic and political authority in Canada with the
instrumentation of National Energy Policy (NEP). The NEP was used to regulate
the petroleum sector and it unilaterally imposed a price schedule that called for
only marginal increments in the domestic prices of oil and natural gas (McLure,
1994, p. 216). This development enraged the energy rich Western provinces
which became hostile towards the NEP and mobilized constitutionally against it.
The major demands of the Westerners were adequate protection of regional
interests in the national arena through the devolution of certain central powers to
the provinces. The other demand was a constitutional safeguard that no national
government would ever again impose an NEP type policy on the provinces
(Lusztig, 1994, pp. 37-39). The federal government was indifferent in this regard.
The NEP cost Alberta alone $60 billion in federal taxation and consumption
subsidies while the federal share of petroleum revenues increased from 10% to
24% at the same period (Lusztig, 1994, p. 38). In the midst of all these
happenings, the Westerners took proactive steps against the federal government.
Alberta cut back on oil production, British Columbia withheld receipts from
export tax on natural gas levied by the federal government and Saskatchewan
challenged the NEP in court. The federal government was thus forced to
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negotiate a settlement of oil and gas prices as well as taxes and revenue sharing
with the westerners and these agreements were on a long term basis (Leach, 1984,
p.17).
The lesson here for Nigeria is that all parties to the conflict exhibited
political maturity by embracing compromise and not heating the polity unduly.
Consultation rather than unilateralism would enhance results of efficiency and
equity. It is worth noting in this connection that in Nigeria in 1969, earlier
conflicts about the ownership and control of oil revenue were unilaterally
determined by the federal government when General Yakubu Gowon
promulgated the Petroleum Decree No. 51 and placed ownership of oil resources
under the federal government (Soremekun & Obi, 1993, pp. 219-220 ). There
were muted rumblings over this federal government take-over but the
government still had her way and this has been entrenched in the nation's
statutory books.

Transfers to Correct Vertical Fiscal Imbalance
Granted that fiscal transfers are used to make up for revenue shortfalls,
(Bahl, 1994, p. 135), Canada makes two main transfers from the federal
government at Ottawa to the provinces. One is called the Canadian Health and
Social Transfer (CHST). Subsumed under this are one for health and the other
for social programs including tertiary education. These transfers (13.5% of
personal income tax and one percent of corporate income tax) both federally
collected and transferred to provinces (McLean, 2003, p. 8) depict that Canadians
see health as overwhelmingly the most important political issue for them. There
is a national commitment to comparable rights for all Canadians on this issue
even though health is primarily a provincial responsibility (McLean, 2003, p. 6).
Much more importantly the CHST bridges the vertical fiscal imbalance between
the provinces and the federal government (Boadway & Watts, 2004, p. 8). Thus
there is really no vertical fiscal inequality because in addition to CHST transfer,
the most robust tax bases are open to both orders of government. Provincial only
sources (natural resource royalties and gambling taxes) are more robust than
federal only sources (such as tariffs). More so, the dominant tax base, customs,
and excise that went to the federal government have now been eroded by the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which provides for free trade
between United States of America, Canada, and Mexico, and the elimination of
custom and excise tariffs and removal of all barriers to trade in goods and
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services (Christian, 2001, p. 513). All the central government pre-occupies itself
with is the use of power of regulation to redistribute a substantial portion of the
revenues among the provinces. Nevertheless, Canadian provinces also engage
with wide-ranging para- diplomacy in order to promote commerce with other
federating units in the United States and other countries. To a considerable
extent this is cumulatively bound to mitigate the impact of the erosion of the
federation's dominant tax base.
Vertical fiscal imbalance is an evident problem in Nigeria. This is because
the federal government controls the most elastic and lucrative sources of income
for the federation. This ranges from oil resources of states to royalties from the
oil, gas, minerals corporate income tax, customs and excise duties, and import
and export taxes. States have been left with personal income tax, vehicle
registration fee, court fees, and other marginal sources of income. The emerging
arrangement for economic integration in the sub-region,-- Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has not been as effective as
AFTA to the extent that it would erode the buoyant sources of revenue for the
federal government. The result is that the central government has more than
enough funds to do whatever it wishes. Taking a cue from the Canadian
experience on management of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (VFI), the Nigerian
government should commit itself to sponsoring and subsidizing national
programs on agriculture, healthcare delivery, and education. These are three
major programs that fundamentally affect the well being of the citizenry of any
nation. If the central government gets actively involved in these programs, it
would have effectively solved a major problem of vertical fiscal imbalance
because a substantial portion of the financial burden for these three essential
service areas are borne by the ~tates with their meager revenues.

Tax Collection
In Canada the federal government collects on behalf of the provinces
provincially levied income taxes in order to facilitate tax harmonization
(Boadway &Watts, 2004, p. 17). Thus tax competition which is always an issue in
federal finance is limited among Canadian provinces (McLean 2003, p. 6).
In constitutional terms, the states and federal government in Nigeria share
the jurisdiction and right to revenue from income taxes. The federal government
of Nigeria has exclusive control over personal income tax from the Armed
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Forces, External Affairs Ministry, alien residents, residents of Federal Capital
Territory, and the Nigerian Police Force. The company income tax is also
exclusively federal. However, all other income taxes (especially personal income
tax) are collected and administered by the federating units as they have exclusive
right to that revenue (The Nigerian Constitution, 1999, Sec. 162). The allocation
of personal income tax to states was meant to help minimize administrative cost,
and ensure relative correspondence between sub-national expenditure
responsibilities and their financial resources. The personal income tax has not
been a buoyant source of revenue for the states and this has kept the VFI very
apparent (Anyanwu, 1999, p. 128).

Para-Diplomacy: A Phenomenon Worthy of Emulation
Para-diplomacy is the term coined to express the movement of federative
units into the field of international relations. Quebec and other Canadian
provinces are engaged in para-diplomacy outside of the Canadian federation. The
motivation for this is that para-diplomacy offers Canadian provinces
opportunities to protect and improve lives of the people they represent, carry out
international trade directly, and gain international presence. It is also provides an
avenue to attract tourists and foreign direct investment, which will cumulatively
improve Canada's global competitiveness (Rodrigues, 2006).
Nigeria's federating units can take a clue from this emergent practice to
tackle VFI. The federative units can engage in international trade, and also attract
foreign direct investment from countries in the West African sub-region and
beyond. This can be a tool to shore up states' finances, protect and improve the
lives of the people they represent, and collectively improve Nigeria's global
competitiveness. On the contrary, Nigerian states are not yet mature enough to
engage in para-diplomacy. This is because the igerian constitution and the
political culture do not leave room for such performance. The implication of
para-diplomacy for a highly centralized federation like Nigeria is that it could
lead to intergovernmental conflict and confusion. Furthermore it could
encourage separatist activities and nationalism in the emerging federation.
Though with measured incremental changes in the body polity, the constitution,
and the political culture, Nigerian states can achieve such status and improve the
lot of their people, the states, and the federation.
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"Need" as a Revenue Sharing Principle
"Need" plays a small role in Canadian intergovernmental fiscal relations
because the cost of delivering public services in poor zones (even with large
population) is lower than in rich ones. This is so because each province negotiates
its own pay arrangements with its employees (McLean, 2003, p. 10). It should also
be noted that "Needs" is contextual. What a province might term as an essential
need may appear as a luxury to another province. Subsequently, this whole
arrangement might act as a disincentive to other provinces (to pay fully to the
central account) and this would in turn inhibit the attainment of fiscal goals set
by the federal government.
One condition that would have necessitated the insertion of a needs-based
formula in revenue allocation is the "sparsity of settlement" (land mass in the
Nigerian context). Canada discouraged the use of this principle by encouraging
migration within the provinces for economic reasons while leaving the large
uninhabited expanse of land fallow till a period it can be appropriated for proper
use. All provinces except Prince Edward Island have sparsely populated
hinterlands (McLean, 2003, p. 13). Rather than appropriating money for an
inefficient principle like "sparsity of settlement" that would really not add value
to human life, the administrators of Canada's federal fiscal system believe that
encouraging migration within the provinces is an efficient cost-saving measure.
For them, the money that would have been appropriated for this formula
(sparsity of settlement) would be better utilized for the benefit of the citizenry
elsewhere.
The Canadian experience with management of sparsely populated provinces
suggests the need for the Nigerian government to re-examine the land mass
principle. The principle does not cut across all states of the federation and it does
not lend itself to the critical logic of fiscal efficiency, fiscal responsibility, and self
reliance which are part of the hallmarks of federalism. The principle was
fashioned out by the military for which expediency was the predominant
deciding factor in the adoption of principles for revenue sharing. Rather than the
federal government appropriating 10% of national revenue for land mass and
terrain principle, the state governments of the large remote and sparsely
populated expanse of lands in the North (because of its arid nature, e.g., Borno
and Yobe) should reduce public expenditure in these areas. They can accomplish
this by encouraging migration within the states. More so, since states control
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their own wage bills, these bills are lower in poor states (like Yobe and Borno)
than in rich states like Lagos and Rivers l . Moreover it is widely accepted that the
disadvantages of poor areas are offset by the lower costs of providing services l
which states' budgets can easily accommodate with the encouragement of
migration. This arrangement will be cost efficient for the Nigerian federation. A
large land size ought to be able to produce large wealth; if it does not, it should be
accepted as fallow until it can properly be reclaimed for profitable use.

From Centralization to Decentralization
Canada has, over 136 years of existence, evolved from a relatively centralized
federation to a more decentralized federal system in the 1970s. A key element in
that trend has been the evolution of its fiscal arrangements. (Boadway & Watts,
2004, p. 15). In marked contrast to Nigeria (which started out as a relatively
decentralized federation and shifted to a centralized one), Canada did not tinker
with her constitution with the sole aim of favoring the federal government.
Before oil was discovered in Alberta, Alberta was one of the poorest provinces.
With the discovery of oil and the rising profile of the province's oil revenue, the
central government did not decide to centralize the control of that resource
because of the reverence for the constitution and the rule oflaw.
In Nigeria, the discovery of oil in the Eastern Region in commercial
quantities made the federal government to promulgate decrees that reflected the
central government's takeover of this hitherto regional jurisdiction. Subsequent
regimes, both military and civil did not reverse the centralization order. On the
contrary, the centralization of this resource base has been entrenched in the
subsequent Nigerian constitutions (The various Nigerian Constitutions: 1979,
1989,1999).
In Canada the provinces have succeeded in obtaining good control over
important sources of revenue and this has facilitated their attainment of some
degree of autonomy. Furthermore, there is no permanent institution to manage
intergovernmental fiscal relations in Canada. According to R.L. Watts, the
reluctance to set up a permanent intergovernmental commission in Canada was
because "such a commission would limit the independence of the provinces
which would in turn minimize the authority of the legislatures" (Akindele, 2001,
p. 20). Intergovernmental fiscal relations in Canada are managed through ad-hoc
decisions reached at administrative conferences. These decisions on fiscal matters
have addressed provincial concerns. Through this process political and economic
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stability has been built into the federation, and the feeling of equity made
apparent among the provinces.
For Nigeria, the replacement of ad-hoc revenue distribution arrangement
with an objective commission, i.e.,-the RMAFC, in 1988, was aimed at insulating
intergovernmental fiscal relations from political pressures for patronage. The
strong history of individually negotiated sharing arrangements between the
regions and the central government, however, has placed great pressure on the
commission forcing her to reconvene annually to address revenue sharing
formulae (Litvack, 1994, p. 234). The RMAFC has primarily been successful at
recommending objective sharing formulae to the heads of state. However, heads
of state through 1988 and 1999 unilaterally modified RMAFC's
recommendations to suit their own perceived world view (Danjuma, 1994, pp.
87-115). Hence RMAFC at this period was not independent and as such could
not enforce informed and objective decisions which would have made states
perceive a greater sense of justice.
With regard to local government funding, all financial transfers to the local
governments in Canada come under the sole control of the provincial
governments. In Nigeria the local governments have been under the direct
control of the central government that distributes statutory funds to them since
the late 1970s. Oftentimes, state governments were bypassed even though the
state governments were also supposed to counter-fund the local governments.
States have not been fulfilling this role (Akpan, 1999, p. 245) because they
themselves do not get adequate funding from the federal government. Besides,
this, the assignment and sharing of major tax bases remain the prerogative of the
federal government. Consequently, over time, the central government has
manipulated tax rates to solve macro-economic problems without bordering
much about the lower levels since the latter are not politically strong and have no
major tax bases assigned to them.

Institutional Framework
There is an institutional factor that directly affects relations between the two
orders of government in the two countries. This has to do with the number of
constituent units. There are 36 states in Nigeria but only 10 provinces in Canada.
Several of the larger and richer Canadian provinces, especially Ontario, Quebec,
Alberta, and British Columbia can challenge the central government. This is
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because they are relatively independent financially and are also political hubs of
power. This is in marked contrast to Nigeria where oil rich states are not strong
enough to attempt credible challenges to the federal government and were they to
do so, they would have problems. This is because the Nigerian constitution has
seriously curtailed the powers of the states, and has enlarged the legislative and
fiscal powers of the central government.
Thus societal and institutional factors have partly accounted for the manifest
differences in the operations of Canadian and Nigerian fiscal federalism. These
factors are cumulative and reinforcing while working in opposite directions:
towards a more centralized regime in Nigeria and a more diffuse distribution of
fiscal and administrative power in Canada.

Significant Differences in the Constitutional and Political Context
There are broad differences in the federal contexts and in the issues of
federal finance between Canada and Nigeria. The Canadian federation operates a
parliamentary system of government which is well suited for a federal country. It
ensures accountability of the executives to the legislature. This is more so because
legislative and executive branches of government are fused within federal
legislature with executives chosen from within and responsible to the legislatures.
The power structure is rather diffused. This contrasts with presidential federalism
that Nigeria adopted. This type of federalism accumulates rather than delegates
powers. The Canadian federation has never experienced military rule.
Authoritarian military rule is alien to her tradition of governance. Canada not
only has a strong culture of liberal democracy but also firmly established
traditions of civilian control over the military. To this extent, the federation has
embraced the intrinsic values of federalism which are the combination of shared
rule through a common government, the over-riding rule of constitutional law,
respect, and tolerance for minorities, respect for the rule of law, and the need for
compromise to achieve democratic consensus.
In Nigeria, military rule excessively centralized administrative and fiscal
structures of government. Thus federal-state relations became not a question of
partnership but rather of the superior giving orders to the subordinate. In terms
of the practice of fiscal federalism, Canada has been able to make considerable
progress because of the relative autonomy granted provinces in the control of
their resources. In addition, Canada has been able to use her power of taxation to
equalize revenue among the provinces. Also this has helped in creating relative
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stability in the system. Beyond this, Canada has been able to adapt well to the
ever--changing demands of her dynamic society. She moved from centralization
in early years of independence to reasonable decentralization in the current
dispensation.
For Nigeria, intergovernmental relations have been less successful partly
because her principles for sharing revenues are unscientific, not pragmatic, and
neither is it dynamic. A case in point is the equalization principle which is highly
politicized. Across the board, all states get particular lump sums irrespective of
their need and absorptive capacity. Also Nigeria has also not been flexible with
the administration of national revenues. While most federations are moving from
centralization to decentralization of fiscal powers, Nigeria has moved in the
opposite direction.

Political Culture as a Critical Factor in the working of Federal Finance
The working of fiscal federalism is very much affected by the political
culture of the country in which such imported institution functions. Political
culture denotes the emotional and attitudinal environment within which the
political system operates. Thus a nation's political culture refers to the people's
orientation towards political objects. There are three typologies of political
culture. These are the parochial, subject, and participant political cultures
(Babawale, 1999, pp. 212-213).
Canada approximates the participant political culture. Here, the public is
aware of both inputs and outputs of government. They believe in their ability to
influence their government, such as in the NEP issue. In addition, the belief or
emotion by virtue of which the rulers claim the moral right to govern and be
obeyed is generally accepted by the citizenry (Babawale, 1999, p. 216). Given this
mature political culture of give and take (such as that which takes place at the
annual meetings of Provincial premiers and their counterparts at Ottawa), there
is an efficient and smooth functioning of the fine tenets of fiscal federalism in
Canada.
Nigeria on the other hand fits into the parochial political culture variety.
Here the citizens do not participate actively in governance as they believe that
they have no influence on the government. The political structures are not
institutionalized, politics is permeated by ethnic sentiments, and dominant
political norms -"rules of the game" -have not been sufficiently internalized
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(Dudley, 1982, p. 76). In addition, institutions of restraint are weak, the public is
weakly organized, and their opinion ignored.
A fundamental reason for the flowering of this disposition in Nigeria can be
attributed to the primacy of the primordial culture in Nigeria's public realm
(Ake, 2000, p. 30). The primordial culture is nurtured by the values of indigenous
societies such as communalism, kinship ties, ethnicity, and regionalism in the
public realm (Ekeh, 1983, pp. 23-24). The coexistence of the primordial and civic
culture (imported from Europe) in the Nigerian public space has inhibited the
equitable and efficient allocation of federal funds. The practice of fiscal federalism
in Nigeria is caught in between these two perspectives (civic and primordial) of
governance. Here legal-rational (official) concerns and communal interests
become entangled. Thus problems of corruption, ethnicity, and inequality in the
distribution of federal resources are then attributed to the fact that the same
individuals (government employees and political office holders) operate in the
two "publics" working at cross purposes.
The non--institutionalization of the civic culture in Nigeria's public realm
has endangered the viability and sustainability of the Nigerian federation and
practice of the fine principles of fiscal federalism in particular. Importantly too,
the hostile and predatory nature of the Nigerian state, averse to social welfare and
provisioning (Ake, 2000, p. 32), has further reinforced the primordial culture in
Nigeria as people retreat back into their ethnic cocoons to incarnate and
revalidate their very being and so (ethnic solidarity group) is worthy of being
defended at all cost

Feasible Course for Political and Administrative Reforms
A Role for the Civil Society
Having identified this problem, the necessity for reform cannot be
overemphasized. Preceding the reforms are the fundamental changes that must
take place in the polity as these are what would guarantee the reforms, ensure
robust practice of fiscal federalism, and promote accountability and transparency
in governance.
To start with, the political culture in Nigeria must change. This will be
facilitated through massive investment in education, mass media, and mass
political mobilization (through reformed political parties, the electoral
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institution, and democratization process) (Babawale, 1999, p.218). In addition
there mu~t be the political will on the part of the state administrators to change
existing harmful political and economic structures.
Observably, the present crop of administrators will most likely resist
fundame~tal political changes because they are core beneficiaries of the present
system. However, the critical agencies that can help in driving the needed
political change are those of the civil society and the ordinary people (through the
development of their own political consciousness, organization, and struggle).
(Ake, 2000, p.19). The civil society occupies the space between the citizens and
the state (Bradley, 2005, p. 64). They can intervene in the social, economic, and
political process to articulate the ethical vision of social life (Adejumobi, 2005, p.
264). It is this agency that will generate, reinforce, and recruit political will for
reform from within the government and perhaps with some measure of external
pressure from international actors (Diamond, 2004, p. 238).
For the civil society to succeed at this enterprise (which will be gradual), it
must be credible, vigorous, and pluralistic, consisting of independent
associations, think tanks, and vibrant mass media. Its credibility would derive
from its fiscal independence, autonomy from the state and the economy, its non
profitability, and its capacity to transcend ethnicity (Obadare, 2004, pp. 147-148).
These attributes will confer strength and legitimacy, and ensure the success of the
civil society in driving for major political changes in the polity. These changes
achieved, the chances are that the public will become more politically articulate
and participate in the decision making process, while the government will also
become more responsive and bestow reverence to public opinion.
These changes will also impact party politics as the political parties are
products of the system and they are in need of reform. For genuinely ideological
groupings to emerge as vibrant political parties there should be a review of the
Nigerian constitution to reflect the democratic tenets of party recognition rather
than registration. The ballot box should be left to determine the viability or
otherwise of any political party in the federation. (Aina, 2004, p. 8)
Restructuring the Federal Edifice

The manageable number of federating units in Canada (10 provinces) can
also be viewed as a factor contributing to the efficiency of federal finance practice
in Canada. Thus it will not be out of place to advocate that the Nigerian state too
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be restructured with the states aligning with the geo-political configuration of the
Nigerian federation. Nigeria can be streamlined into six zones. Each zone has
many things in common in terms of shared historical experience, culture, and
ethnic configuration that existed in the 1950s and early 1960s.
This rationalization process will help check duplication of government
activities, make governance much more cost effective, and compact and
encourage efficiency in delivery of government services. The geo-political
formations would also become the real hubs of power and this will help in further
diffusing the currencies of power by shifting it away from the central government
to the federating units. This can help discourage the intense rush to the centre
(Abuja), as the center would no longer hold much attraction for politicians
(Adedeji, 2001).

Conclusion
Nigeria and Canada provide a fascinating paradox in their practice of fiscal
federalism. The explanation for this lies in the fundamentally different political
cultures, socio-economic, and institutional factors that have shaped federalism
within the two federations. Variations in political culture, socio-economic, and
institutional factors have also had impact on the political process within the two
federal systems. Federalism calls for a pragmatic approach and it also represents a
dynamic political technique for accommodating the circumstances and needs of
the particular society in question. However, lessons from this comparative
exercise also show that there are essential tenets that support the practice of fiscal
federalism universally and which can be functional in Nigeria if meticulously
applied. Some of these tenets include constitutionalism (the rule of law) of the
citizenry imbibing the spirit of equality before the law and political maturity.
Among other things, this spirit could check the intervention of the military in
governance and other constitutional breaches. Other tenets are accountability of
the leadership to the masses (electorate), transparency and accountability in
government expenditure, and revenue sharing among the federating units.
Furthermore, revenue sharing, vertically and horizontally should be based
on mutual convenience and compromise, like what obtains in Canada rather than
on statutes which presently obtains in Nigeria. Nigerian government should
engage in non-politicized interventionist policies of giving specific- purpose
grants to needy states to tackle specific challenges. For instance, oil spillage,
erosion, and desertification are genuine environmental challenges that the federal
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government can assist with counterpart funding unlike land mass and terrain
which is "political" in nature. To check the misappropriation of these funds, the
funds should go directly to the local governments as they are the closest to the oil
communities. Crash programs on management of revenues should be conducted
for the fund managers at the local government level. Thus protests by the
aggrieved communities would be directed not at the state or federal government
nor the oil companies but at their elected sons and daughters at the local
government and ward levels if the funds are misappropriated. Besides,
institutions of restraint should be strengthened, the civil society should be alive to
its responsibilities while legal codes should be modernized, and the judicial
system empowered with significant capacity and independence to perform its
constitutional role.
On a final note, every change initiative begins and ends with leadership
which is a decisive factor in governance. In the Canadian federation, which I have
examined, the leadership has attained the level of statesmanship, transcending
parochial interest. The Canadian statesmanlike approach to politics guarantees
for the interest of all citizens of the federation irrespective of their ideological
leaning, gender, ethnic background, and political party affiliation. In the same
vein, the practice of fiscal federalism in Nigeria would be enriched if Nigerian
politicians imbibe the statesmanlike approach to politics. The ultimate challenge
to Nigeria is to evolve its own federal system to suit its own circumstances, ensure
the welfare of every Nigerian, and strengthen the desire to stay together.

Notes
lIn Nigeria the cost of living in industrialized and commercial areas like Lagos in the
southwest and Portharcourt in the South-South is high, while it is low in states like Oyo in the
South~est and Borno, Yobe, and Sokoto states in the North because they are not industrialized
states.

References
Adebayo, A. G. (1993). Embattled federalism: History of revenue allocation in Nigeria, 1946-1990.
New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.
Adedeji, A. (2001, April, 27). Mastering Nigeria's conflict: The imperative of restructuring true
federalism. The 2001 Obafemi Awolowo Memorial lecture. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs.
.

42

I Journal of Global Initiatives

Adejumobi. S. (2005). Civil society and federalism in Nigeria. In O. Ebere & RT. Suberu (Eds.).
Nigerian federalism in crisis: Critical perspectives and political options (pp. 263-279).
Ibadan: John Archers.
Ake. e. (2000). The feasibility of democracy in Africa. Wiltshire: Antony Rowe Ltd.
Akindele. R. A. (2001). Nigeria in the market of experiments in federalism. In J. 1. Eliagwu. & R. A.
Akindele (Eds.). Foundations of Nigerian Federalism. 1960-95 (pp. 1-39). Jos. Nigeria:
Institute for Governance and Social Research.
Akpan. H. E. (1999) Fiscal federalism and local government finance in Nigeria. In B. E. Aigbokhan
(Ed.). Fiscal federalism and Nigeria's economic development (pp. 239-251). Ibadan:
Nigerian Economic Society.
Aina, A.D. (2004). Party and Electoral Politics. In A.B. Adigun. L. Diamond & O. Eber~ (Eds.),
Nigeria's struggle for democracy and good governance (pp. 83-100). Ibadan: Ibadan
University Press.
Anyan....o'U. J.e. (1999).Fiscal relations among the various tiers of government in Nigeria. In B. E.
Aigbokhan (Ed.). Fiscal federalism and Nigeria's economic development (pp. 119 - 144).
Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society.
obie. A. (2001). Centralizing trends in Nigerian federalism. In J. 1. Eliagwu & R A. Akindele.
(Eds.). Foundations of Nigerian federalism: 1960-1995 (pp. 125 - 65). Jos. igeria:
Institute for Governance and Social Research.
A 'oade. B. Personal communication. October 24, 2006.
Babawale. T. (1999). Political culture and political socialization. In R Anifowose & F. Enemuo
(Eds.). Elements of politics (pp. 210-225). Lagos: Malthouse Press.
Bahl. R (1994). Revenues and Revenue Assignment: Intergovernmental fiscal relations in Russian
Federation. In e. 1. Wallich (Ed.). Russia and the Challenges of Fiscal Federalism (pp.
129-180). Washington, D.e.: World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies IBRD.
Boadway. R & Watts. R L. (2004). Fiscal federalism in Canada. the U.S.A. and Germany. Accessed
on
October
10.
2009.
from
Queens
University.
Canada.
http://wwwqueensu.ca/iigr/working/watts/wattsboadway
Bradley. M. T. (2005). Civil society and democratic progression in post colonial Nigeria. Journal of
Civil Society 1(1).61-74.
Calvocorressi. P. (2001). World Politics, 1945-2000. London: Pearson Publishers.
Chri tain. T. (2001). European and regional integration. In ). Baylis and S. Smith (Eds.). The
globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations (pp. 494-518).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1979) Lagos Printer: Federal Government Press.
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1989) Lagos: Federal Government Press.
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) Lagos: Federal Government Press.
Danjuma. T. (1994). Revenue sharing and the political economy of Nigerian federalism. In ). 1.
Eliagwu. P.e. Logams and H. S. Galadima. (Eds.), Federalism and nation building in
Nigeria: The challenges of the 21st century (pp. 87-115). Abuja: The ational Council on
Intergovernmental Relations.
Dare, L. (2003). Federalist deconcentration and group rights in Canada: Some les ons for igeria.
In A. T. Gana & S. Egwu (Eds.). Federalism in Africa: Framing the ational Question (pp.
91-113). Asmara Eriteria: African World Press.

Ekanade Olumide

I 43

Diamond, 1. (2004). Building a system of comprehensive accountability to control corruption. In
A.B. Adigun, 1. Diamond & O. Ebere (Eds.), Nigeria's struggle for democracy and good
governance (pp. 221-240). Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
Dudley, B. (1982). An Introduction to igerian government and politics. London: Macmillan
Publishers.
Ekanade, O.V. (2008). Fiscal federalism in Nigeria: 1960 -1999. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.
University ofIbadan, igeria.
Ekeh, P. P. (1983). Colonialism and social structure: An Inaugural Lecture. University of Ibadan,
Ibadan: University Press.
Esman, M. j. (1984). Federalism and modernisation: Canada and the U.S.A. Publius: The journal of
Federalism 14 (1), 21 - 38.
Leach, H. R. (1984). Canadian federalism revisited: Publius: The journal of Federalism, 14 (1), 8 -19
Litvack, j. (1994). Regional demands and Fiscal Federalism. In C. 1. WalHch (Ed.), Russia and the
challenges of fiscal federalism (pp. 218-240). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Regional
and Sectoral Studies IBRD.
Lusztig, M. (1995). Federalism and institutional design; The perils and politics of a Triple - E Senate
in Canada, Publius: The journal of Federalism 25(1), 35-48.
Mathews, R. L. (1974a). Fiscal equalization models. In R. 1. Mathews (Ed.), Fiscal equalization in a
federal system (pp. 12- 38). Camberia, Australia: Centre for Research on Federal Finance
Relations. The Australian National University, Camberia (Research Monograph No.4.).
(1974b). Grants criteria for equalization grants. In R. L .Mathews (Ed.), Fiscal
Equalization in a Federal System, (pp. 3-10). Camberia. Australia: Centre for Research on
Federal Finance Relations. The Australian National University, Camberia (Research
Monograph No.4).
McLean, 1. (2003). Fiscal federalism in Canada:. Retrieved October 10, 2009.University of Oxford
from http://www.nuf.ox.ac. uk/ politics/papers/2003/mcLean%20canada
McLure, E. C. (1994). The sharing of taxes on natural resources and the future of Russian
federation. In C. 1. Wallich (Ed.), Russia and the challenges of fiscal federalism (pp. 181217). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies IBRD.
Oates, E. W. (1972). Fiscal f~deralism. New York: Harcourt Brace jovanorich.
Obadare, E. (2004). Manufacturing civil society: The Abacha junta and the struggle for public space
in Nigeria. In A. B. Adigun, 1. Diamond & O. Ebere (Eds.), Nigeria's struggle for
democracy and good governance (pp. 133-152). Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
Olomola, S. A. (1999). Restructuring of Nigeria's fiscal system: Rationale, strategies and policies. In
B. E Aigbokhan, (Ed.), Fiscal federalism and Nigeria's economic development. (pp. 477499). Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society.
Rodrigues, G. M. (2006, October, 25). The global dialogue on foreign relations in federal countries.
Symposium conducted at the Forum of Federations, Ottawa, Canada. Accessed on july
10, 2010. from http://www.forumfed.org/pubs/20070615_Globaldialogue.doc.
Ronald, 1. W. (1987). The American Constitution in Comparative Perspective: A Comparison of
Federalism in the United States and Canada. The journal of American History 74, (3),
769-792. Retrieved july 14,2010 from jstor.
Smiley, D. V. (1984). Public sector politics, modernizatjon and federalism. The Canadian and
American experiences. Publius: The journal of Federalism, 14(1),39-62.

44

I Journal of Global Initiatives

Soremekun, K.. & ObLe. (1993). Oil and the National Question. In Proceedings of the 1993 Annual
Conference, (pp. 209-231). Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society.
Todaro, M. P. (1998). Economic development. London: Adisson Wesley and Longman

